PSYCHOLOGY 7536: HEURISTICS AND BIASES IN INTUTIVE JUDGMENT

Calendar

Meeting location: Institute for Cognitive Science (4th floor Muenzinger, D428)

Class 1, 12 Jan, Introduction and organization

No class, 19 Jan, SPSP

Class 2, 24 Jan, Availability (Joanne & Michaela)

Tverksy, A., & Kahneman, D.  (1973).  Availability: A heuristic for judging frequency and probabilityCognitive Psychology, 4, 207-232.

Ross, M., Sicoly, F.  (1979).  Egocentric biases in availability and attributionJournal of Personality and Social Psychology, 37, 322-336.

Schwarz, N., & Vaughn, L. A.  The availability heuristic revisited: Ease of recall and content of recall as distinct sources.  GGK.

Oppenheimer, D. (2003).  Spontaneous discounting of availability in frequency judgment tasks.  Psychological Science, 15, 100-105.

Class 3, 31 Jan, Representativeness (Dave)

Tverksy, A., & Kahneman, D. (1971).  Belief in the law of small numbersPsychological Bulletin, 2, 105-110.

Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1972).  Subjective probability:  A judgment of representativeness. Cognitive Psychology, 3, 430-454.

Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. Extensional vs. intuitive reasoning:  The conjunction fallacy in probability judgment.  GGK

Kahneman, A., & Frederick, S.  Representativeness revisited: Attribute substitution in intuitive judgment.  GGK

Class 4, 7 Feb, Anchoring (and adjustment) (Jordan)

Gilbert, D. T.  Inferential correction.  GGK.

Strack, F., & Mussweiler, T.  (1997).  Explaining the enigmatic anchoring effect: Mechanisms of selective accessibility.  Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 73, 437-446.

Trope, Y., & Gaunt, R.  (2000).  Processing alternative explanations of behavior: correction or integration?  Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 79, 344-354.

Epley, N., & Gilovich, T.  Putting adjustment back in the anchoring and adjustment heuristic.  GGK.

Class 5, 14 Feb, Affect (Michaela)

Slovic, et al.  The affect heuristic.  GGK.

Schawarz, N.  Feelings as information: Moods influence judgments and processing strategies.  GGK.

Forgas, J.P. (1998). On being happy but mistaken: Mood effects on the fundamental attribution error. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 75, 318-331.   

Tiedens, L. Z., & Linton, S.  (2001).  Judgment under emotional certainty and uncertainty: The effects of specific emotions on information processing.  Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 81, 973-988.

Class 6, 21 Feb, Judgmental myopia and focalism (Jordan)

Kruger, J., & Burrus, J.  (2004).  Egocentrism and focalism in unrealistic optimism (and pessimism)Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 40, 332-340.

Wilson, T. D., Wheatley, T., Meyers, J., Gilbert, D. T., & Axsom, D. (2000). Focalism: A source of durability bias in affective forecasting. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 78, 821-836.

Moore, D. A., & Kim, T. G.  (2003).  Myopic social prediction and the solo comparison effectJournal of Personality and Social Psychology, 85, 1121-1135.

Moore, D. A., & Small, D. A.  (2005).  Error and bias in comparative social judgment: On being both better and worse than we think we are.  Unpublished manuscript, Carnegie Mellon University.

Class 7, 28 Feb, Recognition, fast and frugal (Greg)

Goldstein, D.G., & Gigerenzer, G. (2002).  Models of ecological rationality:  The recognition heuristic.  Psychological Review, 109, 75-90.

Oppenheimer, D.M.  (2003).  Not so fast! (and not so frugal!):  rethinking the recognition heuristic.  Cognition, 90, B1-B9.

Gigerenzer, G.  (1996).  On narrow norms and vague heuristics: A reply to Kahneman and Tversky.  Psychological Review, 103, 592–596.

Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A.  (1996).  On the reality of cognitive illusionsPsychological Review, 103, 592–591.

Class 8, 7 Mar, Support Theory (Dave & Jen)

Rottenstreich, Y., & Tversky, A.  Unpacking, repacking, and anchoring: Advances in Support Theory.  GGK.

Tversky, A,. & Koehler, D. J.  Support Theory: A nonextensional representation of subjective probability.  GGK.

Brenner, L. A., Koehler, D. J., & Rottenstreich.  Remarks on Support Theory: Recent advances and future directions.  GGK.

Savitsky, K. K., Van Boven, L., Epley, N., & Wight, W.  (in press).  The unpacking effect in allocations of responsibility for group tasks. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology.

Class 9,14 Mar, Counterfactual thinking and regret (Laurie)

Kahneman, D., & Miller, D. T.  Norm Theory: Comparing reality to its alternatives.  GGK.

Medvec, V. H., Maday, S. F., & Gilovich. T.  When less is more: Counterfactual thinking and satisfaction among Olympic medalists.  GGK.

McGraw, A. P., Mellers, B., & Tetlock, P.  (in press). Expectations and emotions of  Olympic athletes. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology.

Kruger, J., Wirtz, D., & Miller, D.T. (in press).  Counterfactual thinking and the first instinct fallacyJournal of Personality and Social Psychology.

Class 10, 28 Mar, Affective forecasting (Joanne & Laurie)

Gilbert, et al.  Durability bias in affective forecasting.  GGK.

Loewenstein, G. (1996). Out of control: Visceral influences on behavior.  Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 65, 272–292.

Hsee, C.K., & Zhang, J.  (2004).  Distinction bias: Misprediction and mischoice due to joint evaluation.  Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 86, 680-695.

Van Boven, L., & Kane, J. (in press).  Predicting feelings versus choices.  In E. C. Chang & L. J. Sanna (Eds.), Judgment over time: The interplay of thoughts, feelings, and behaviors

Class 11, 4 Apr, Debiasing and expertise (Amanda & Jo)

Phillips, J. K., Klein, G., Seick, W. R.  (2004).  Expertise in judgment and decision making: A case for training intuitive decision skills. In D. K. Koehler and N. Harvey (Eds.), Blackwell Handbook of Judgment and Decision Making (pp. 297-315).  New York: Blackwell Publishing.

Wilson, T. D., Centerbar, D. B., & Brekke, N.  Mental contamination and the debiasing problem.  GGK.

Larrick, R. P.  (2004).  Debiasing. In D. K. Koehler and N. Harvey (Eds.), Blackwell Handbook of Judgment and Decision Making (pp. 316-337).  New York: Blackwell Publishing.

Dawes, R. M., Faust, D., & Meehl, P. E.  Clinical versus actuarial judgment.  GGK.

Class 12, 11 Apr, Confidence (Greg)

Gill, M. J., Swann, W.B., Silvera, D. H.  (1998).  On the genesis of confidence. Journal of Personality & Social Psychology, 75, 1101–1114.

Griffin, D., & Tverksy, A.  The weighing of evidence and the determinants of confidence.  GGK, pp. 230–249.

Griffin, D., Dunning, D., & Ross, L.  (1990).  The role of construal processes in overconfident predictions about the self and othersJournal of Personality and Social Psychology, 56, 1128-1139.

McGraw, A. Peter, Mellers, Barbara, & Ritov, Ilana (2004). The affective costs of overconfidence. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 17, 281-295. 

Class 13, 18 Apr, Egocentrism (Jo)

Epley, N., Keysar, B., Van Boven, L., & Gilovich, T.  (2004).  Perspective taking as egocentric anchoring and adjustmentJournal of Personality and Social Psychology, 87, 327­–339.

Van Boven, L., Loewenstein, G., & Dunning, D.  (in press).  The illusion of courage in social-predictions: Underestimating the impact of fear of embarrassment on other people.  Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes.

Karniol, R.  (2003).  Egocentrism versus protocentrism: The status of self in social prediction.  Psychological Review, 110, 564–580.

Ames, D.  (2004).  Inside the mind-reader’s toolkit: Projection and stereotyping in mental state inference.  Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 87, 340-353.

Class 14, 25 Apr, Self-insight and perceptions of bias (Amanda & Jen)

Pronin, E., Gilovich, T., & Ross, L.  (2004).  Objectivity in the eye of the beholder: Divergent perceptions of bias in self versus others.  Psychological Review, 3, 781–799.

Van Boven, L., White, K., Kamada, A., & Gilovich, T. (2003). Intuitions about situational correction in self and others. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 85, 249–258.

Taylor, S. E., & Armor, D. A.  When predictions fail: The dilemma of unrealistic optimism.  GGK.

Kruger, J., & Dunning, D. (1999). Unskilled and unaware of it: How difficulties in recognizing one's own incompetence lead to inflated self-assessments. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 77, 1121-1134.